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Abstract
Research on mass media in authoritarian regimes focuses more on state mechanisms of control than on actual media re-
porting and on moments of crises much more than on times of stable functioning of the regime. In order to shed more
light on the role of journalistic mass media in authoritarian regimes, this article deals with the actual limits of pluralism in
media reporting regarding policy issues in ‘ordinary’ authoritarian politics. Looking at pluralism in sources (i.e., actors being
quoted) and pluralism in opinion, the article also deals with the often assumed increasing degree of pluralism from TV over
print media to the Internet. This study is based on a qualitative content analysis of media reporting on export pipelines
in three post-Soviet authoritarian regimes (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). The text corpus comprises 3,618
media reports from 38 different journalistic media outlets published between 1998 and 2011. Two major results of the
study are, first, that concerning the degree of pluralism, the differences between types of media are country specific, and,
second, that ‘limited pluralism’ seems to be a misnomer, as the political opposition—at least in our cases—regularly does
not have a voice at all.
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1. Introduction
Juan Linz has famously defined authoritarian regimes
as ‘political systems with limited, not responsible, polit-
ical pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology,
but with distinctivementalities, without extensive nor in-
tensive political mobilization, except at some points in
their development, and in which a leader or occasion-
ally a small group exercises power within formally ill-
defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’ (Linz,
2000, p. 159). He went on to clarify that there is a ‘fairly
wide range [of pluralism] inwhich those regimes operate’
(Linz, 2000, p. 161).
Since Linz published the first version of his definition
in 1964, political scientists have extensively examined the
meaning of limited pluralism and its empirical forms in
the case of political forces, such as government institu-
tions, political parties, and different kinds of elite factions.
While Linz originally developed a typology based on sev-
eral qualitative aspects, including the social origin of the
ruling elites, their guidingmentality and the development
stage of the regime, newer typologies of authoritarian
political regimes focus more exclusively on the degrees
of pluralism or political competition (cf. e.g., Diamond,
2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Roessler & Howard, 2009),
where the central distinction is between hybrid regimes
(which combine democratic and authoritarian features)
and fully authoritarian regimes. Brownlee (2009) as well
as Roessler and Howard (2009) use ‘closed authoritarian-
ism’ to designate cases of extreme authoritarian control.
The role of mass media in authoritarian regimes,
though, has gained little attention in political science,
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while the mainstream of media studies deals almost ex-
clusively with democratic regimes. Existing research on
mass media in authoritarian regimes focuses more on
statemechanisms of control than on actualmedia report-
ing and much more on moments of crises for the regime
(related to protests and potential democratization) than
on times of its stable functioning.
In order to better understand the role of mass media
in the functioning of authoritarian regimes, our analysis
asks how pluralistic actual media reporting on an ‘ordi-
nary’ policy issue is in fully authoritarian regimes.
Most literature on authoritarian regimes perceives
mass media (often implicitly) as a mere transmitter of
messages (‘propaganda’) produced by the ruling political
elites (see Walker & Orttung, 2014, for a recent example
with an explicit reference to mass media). Akhrarkhod-
jaeva (2017, summarized in Tables 2.5–2.7) has con-
ducted ameta-analysis of political regime typologies and
a dataset of electoral malpractice compiled by Sarah
Birch, which—taken together—show that manipulation
of mass media reporting is the second most common de-
viation from democratic standards in fully authoritarian
regimes. In this view, there is no pluralism and thosewho
are visible in media reporting represent the ruling elites.
Accordingly, media appearances could be used to anal-
yse the composition of the ruling elites.
However, there is also an alternative view in the liter-
ature which stresses the need of the ruling elites to get
reliable information regarding public sentiment concern-
ing important policy issues. It has also been argued that
media reporting can be used to give criticism a controlled
channel of expression in order to avoid unexpected and
harder to control eruptions of public anger in the form of
protests. Based on a large-scale analysis of online censor-
ship by the Chinese government King, Pan and Roberts
(2013, p. 339) argue that the Chinese leaders ‘seem to
recognize, looking bad does not threaten their hold on
power so long as they manage to eliminate discussions
associated with events that have collective action poten-
tial’. The authors claim that ‘this ‘loosening’ up on the
constraints on public expression may, at the same time,
be an effective governmental tool in learning how to
satisfy, and ultimately mollify, the masses’. Heydemann
(2007, p. 21) claims that Arab authoritarian rulers ‘recog-
nize the value of these technologies [i.e. new media] as
steam valves: outlets that mitigate social pressures that
might otherwise become politicized’.
In this context, it is also often argued that the In-
ternet offers a new opportunity for dissenting voices in
authoritarian regimes (for an exemplary critical discus-
sion of this argument related to our case countries see
Imamova, 2015; Pearce, 2014). Looking at pluralism in
mass media reporting, our analysis also tests the hypoth-
esis of an increasing degree of pluralism from TV over
print media to the Internet (i.e., news websites in the
case of journalistic mass media).
2. Operationalizing Media Pluralism
At its core, media pluralism is a normative concept, re-
lated to the democratic idea of free debates, implying
the ability to challenge existing power relations and to
engage in a debate based on the merits of the better
argument (cf. e.g., Hrvatin & Petković, 2015; Karppinen,
2013). At the same time, it is not possible to determine
an ideal score of perfect pluralism. As pluralism is not a
value in itself (‘the more, the merrier’), it is restricted to
(what is deemed to be) legitimate ideas presented in an
accepted manner with reasonable arguments.
In this context, Valcke, Picard and Sükösd (2015) dif-
ferentiate between external pluralism, the plurality of
media outlets and media ownership, and internal plu-
ralism, the plurality of opinions in actual reporting. As
the authors highlight, although the conditions of external
pluralism ‘increase the possibility of achieving the objec-
tives of pluralism, they do not guarantee it because they
are not necessary and sufficient conditions for its exis-
tence’ (Valcke et al., 2015, p. 2). Nevertheless, attempts
to measure media pluralism focus on external pluralism,
not only because it is easier tomeasure, but also because
policymeasures to improve—or in the case of authoritar-
ian regimes, restrict—media pluralism are foremost di-
rected at external pluralism (cf. e.g., Aslama et al., 2007;
Picard, 2000).
However, in order to assess ‘limited pluralism’ as a
core feature of authoritarian regimes and, thereby, to un-
derstand the visibility of alternative opinions in author-
itarian regimes, internal pluralism is the vital indicator.
In this sense, ‘political pluralism in the media refers to
fair and diverse representation of, and expression by (i.e.,
passive and active access) various political and ideologi-
cal groups, including minority viewpoints and interests,
in the media’ (Hrvatin & Petković, 2015, p. 113).
In order to assess the ‘limited pluralism’ in media re-
porting, this analysis will focus on actual reporting (in-
ternal pluralism) in the case of ‘ordinary politics’, i.e.,
debates about a policy issue. For an assessment of plu-
ralism in everyday politics, the policy issue under study
should not directly challenge regime legitimacy; how-
ever, it should be related to political decisions and be
of great relevance for the respective country, so that
the political leadership cannot simply ignore the issue.
Moreover, the selected issue should allow for more than
one policy decision as an outcome, so that there is—in
principle—room for a pluralistic debate. To allow for a
comparison between countries, the respective policy is-
sue should fulfil these criteria in all case countries over a
longer period of time.
In order to measure internal pluralism, this analysis
refers to ‘sources’ (i.e., various political and ideological
groups) as well as ‘opinions’ (i.e., various viewpoints and
interests). The first aspect indicates the variety of people
or institutions being quoted by journalists. The key ques-
tion concerning ‘limited pluralism’ here is to what extent
voices not belonging to the ruling elites are being quoted
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and which voices in particular. The second aspect indi-
cates a variety of opinions (independently of the author).
The key question concerning ‘limited pluralism’ here is
to what extent diverging and conflicting opinions can be
voiced in the media.
For the actual content analysis, themost popular me-
dia as well as the media outlets of the major political
camps should be included. The focus of this analysis is
exclusively on journalistic mass media, as social media
require a different form of analysis.
In order to identify sources of information (as op-
posed to mere references to actions by the same people
or institutions) and, even more so, to identify opinions,
the qualitative content analysis has to be done manu-
ally with the support of specialised coding software. In
the text corpus, we have coded all sources being quoted
(including interviews and guest authors). In order to as-
sess plurality of opinion, frames1 related to the policy is-
sue have been coded, as well as whether the respective
frame is thought to be adequate or not (i.e., whether the
frame ‘explains’ the respective policy issue). Finally, pos-
itive and negative references to specific policy options
have also been coded.
3. Case Selection
For our analysis, we have opted for authoritarian states
in the post-Soviet region, as they qualify as most sim-
ilar cases in terms of historical and geopolitical con-
text. Moreover, with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk-
menistan, three authoritarian states can be selected for
which the construction of oil and gas export pipelines is
a relevant and similar policy issue over a long-term pe-
riod. This policy issue is controversial, as pipelines have
been proposed in all cardinal directions: north to/via
Russia, east to China, south to/via Iran or Afghanistan
and west to Turkey and/or the European Union. Plans
for the construction of oil and gas pipelines from the
Caspian region have been drafted since in the late 1990s.
All major projects starting in the three countries were
completed by 2011 (for an overview of the post-Soviet
pipeline infrastructure see Heinrich, 2014; for related of-
ficial discourses see Heinrich & Pleines, 2015). Accord-
ingly, our analysis looks at mass media reporting on ex-
port pipelines from 1998 to 2011.
Comparative political science literature (namely Dia-
mond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Roessler & Howard,
2009) largely agrees that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan be-
long to the category of full or hegemonic authoritarian
regimes, while Turkmenistan is often described as closed
authoritarian. This assessment is also confirmed by politi-
cal regime indices (namely FreedomHouse, Polity IV, Ber-
telsmann Transformation Index and Economist Democ-
racy Index); Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are clearly in the
group of authoritarian countries, while Turkmenistan re-
ceives the most extreme values (for an overview see
Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2017, Tables 1.6 and 1.7).
Country rankings of press freedom match the over-
all assessments of the political regimes. In the ‘Freedom
of the Press Index’ (FreedomHouse) both Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan score between 65 and 85 on a scale from 0 to
100, where a score above 60 indicates ‘not free’. For both
countries, the long-term trend is a slight worsening of
the situation. Turkmenistan scores above 85 for the full
period under study. In the ‘Press Freedom Index’ com-
piled by Reporters without Borders all three countries
are continuously ranked among the 80 worst countries,
Turkmenistan is often among the 10 worst (an overview
of the rankings is provided by Pleines, 2014).
All studies on mass media in the case countries de-
scribe different mechanisms of state-organised media
control and repression, i.e. restrictions to external plural-
ism (Allison, 2006; Anceschi, 2015; Freedman & Shafer,
2011, 2014; Freedman, Shafer, & Antonova, 2010; Ju-
nisbai, 2011; Kazimova, 2011; Kenny & Gross, 2008;
Lange, 1997; Laruelle, 2015; Lewis, 2016; Nazarbetova,
Shaukenova, & Eschment, 2016; Pearce, 2014, 2015;
Pearce & Kendzior, 2012), while the official legal frame-
work may claim differently (cf. Richter, 2008).
Media consumption in the case countries is domi-
nated by largely government-controlled TV broadcasting,
which is the primary source of information for the vast
majority of the populace. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
the circulation of independent newspapers and journals
has, since the 1990s by and large, been restricted to
the major cities because many people cannot afford to
buy printmedia and there are logistical, commercial, and
political restrictions to country-wide distribution (Cauca-
sus Analytical Digest, 2011; Junisbai, Junisbai, & Ying Fry,
2015). The importance of the Internet has increased sig-
nificantly over the period under study. According to ‘In-
ternet World Stats’, Internet penetration (in percentage
of the population) rose from 0.1% in 2000 to 44% in 2011
in Azerbaijan and from 0.5% to 35% in Kazakhstan.2 Turk-
menistan is in a separate league, mainly due to direct
state control and censorship of all mass media in the
country (Anceschi, 2011). In order to ensure control, ac-
cess to the Internet has been heavily restricted in the
country. Internet penetration still stood at a mere 2%
in 2011.3
Our analysis covers the reporting by national news-
papers, journals, TV stations, and professional (journal-
istic) Internet sites in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turk-
menistan. Only mass media with nation-wide (or capital-
based) coverage that addresses a national audience in
the respective country were included. Media that con-
tained, on average, less than one report on our topic
per year was not included. News agencies were not in-
1 Frames can be defined as the basic cognitive structures that guide the perception and representation of reality (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). ‘To frame is to select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52, emphasis in the original).
2 Internet World Stats, available at http://www.internetworldstats.com
3 Internet World Stats, available at http://www.internetworldstats.com
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cluded because they do not directly participate in na-
tional debates.
For Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the database in-
cludes a large part of the most popular (print, TV, and
Internet) and important media for the major political
camps as well as national specialised business journals
from 1998 to 2011, if these exist. The most popular TV
stations and printmedia were identified based on viewer
statistics, print circulation figures, public surveys on me-
dia consumption, and expert assessments. For Internet
sites in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, lists of the most fre-
quented news websites were used.4 For Turkmenistan,
which has strong state control over all media, only the
state TV channels have been included in the analysis.
The resulting text corpus comprises 3,618 media re-
ports on export pipelines published between 1998 and
2011 by 38 different journalistic media outlets. As ex-
plained in section 2, our analysis considers pluralism in
sources (i.e., actors being quoted) and pluralism in opin-
ion based on manual software-aided coding.5
4. Results
As TV dominates media consumption in all three case
countries, we begin with an analysis of pluralism of
sources, i.e. actors being quoted, in TV reporting. For
TV channels, the text corpus comprises a total of 925
‘quotes’, i.e., direct or indirect quotes plus interviews. Of
these, 565 are fromAzerbaijan (AZ), 124 fromKazakhstan
(KAZ), and 236 from Turkmenistan (TKM). If we consider
all pro-government actors, i.e., politicians and state offi-
cials who are part of the ruling elites, their share in the
total number of TV quotes stands at 52% for Azerbaijan,
59% for Kazakhstan, and 79% for Turkmenistan, as shown
in Table 1. At the same time, a real opposition, i.e. politi-
cians openly opposing the government, is only verifiable
in Azerbaijan, where it accounts for 1% of all quotes.
It is telling for the special position of Turkmenistan
that the president personally accounts for nearly two
thirds of all pipeline-related quotes, combined with offi-
cials of the regime increasing to a total share of 79%. All
the remaining quotes come from foreign politicians and
business people, mainly in the form of selected quotes
from official (i.e., diplomatically phrased) press confer-
ences after meetings. Compared to Turkmenistan, there
is more diversity in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. First, the
quotes from representatives of the regime are much less
dominated by the presidents personally; instead, a larger
number of people speak for the regime. Although the
outspoken political opposition is in fact banned from TV
appearances, independent domestic actors, namely ex-
perts and representatives of (foreign) private business,
are clearly visible.
The interesting question, therefore, is whether this
broader variety of people being quoted is reflected in
a broader variety of opinions in media reporting. In a
first step, we look at different groups of arguments—
‘frames’—used to justify or explain pipeline decisions. In
the case of export pipelines, the ‘classical’ frames are
‘geopolitics’, whereby pipelines are considered as a way
to foster alliances in foreign policy, and ‘profitability’, i.e.
pipelines are a means of generating financial income for
the country (see Heinrich & Pleines, 2015, for details on
these frames).
Our results show that some ‘apolitical’ frames, namely
‘diversification’ and ‘technical feasibility’, are quite pop-
ular, while controversial issues like the ‘environment’ or
the ‘resource curse’, i.e. the negative consequences of
a resource boom, are by and large neglected. However,
in each country, the five most popular frames are men-
Table 1. Share of different groups in total number of quotes in TV reporting. Source: Authors’ own analysis and calculation.
AZ (TV) KAZ (TV) TKM (TV)
President 23% 27% 63%
Pro-government politicians 15% 18% 14%
State officials 14% 15% 13%
Total official regime 52% 59% 79%
Opposition 11% 10% 10%
Foreign politicians 17% 19% 15%
Business representatives 24% 19% 16%
Experts 15% 13% 10%
N (total no. of quotes) 565 124 236
4 For Kazakhstan, they were compiled by zero.kz on the basis of actual internet traffic. For Azerbaijan, data on the most popular news websites were
taken from a representative opinion poll conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre.
5 Detailed documentation concerning the creation of the text corpus, along with the codebook, is available at http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.
de/UserFiles/file/Pipelines-Caspian_media-list+codebook.pdf
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tioned in at least 10% of all media reports. That means
that there is variety when it comes to arguments about
specific policy decisions (i.e., pipeline routes in our case).
However, this variety is largely consensual. In the
case of Turkmenistan, the 369 reports included in the
analysis comprise only 13 remarks questioning the ap-
propriateness of a specific frame; nine of them relate to
‘political feasibility’, thus in fact supporting the official
project of a pipeline through Afghanistan despite ques-
tions about its political feasibility. Kazakhstan has the
highest number of critical comments about frames, a to-
tal of 118 accounting for 8% of all reports included in the
analysis. Here, two-thirds refer to ‘geopolitics’ and ‘prof-
itability’. In both cases, the largest share of critical com-
ments can be attributed to business journals and news
websites. In Azerbaijan, critical comments about the ad-
equateness of specific frames are more evenly spread.
Throughout the full text corpus, there is no recognisable
pattern, neither concerning media type nor political ori-
entation. However, in total only 4% of media reports in
Azerbaijan include a critical reflection about frames.
When it comes to concrete policy decisions, i.e., an
opinion for or against a specific pipeline project, the large
majority of reports avoid any clear position. In all three
countries, about 60% of assessments made neither sup-
port nor criticize the pipeline projects they are reporting
about. Quite often this makes for very dull reading with
long lists of technical information about pipeline routes,
partners, and through-put volumes.
In order to understand pluralism of media report-
ing in a political regime, it is also important to as-
sess differences by media type. This question relates
to the idea that—although mass media reaching the
whole population, namely TV, is strongly controlled by
the state—there are niches of pluralism in authoritarian
regimes which are, in principle, accessible for large parts
of the population. Although most people never bother
to get access, in times of growing discontent with the
regime, these media outlets—and the journalists work-
ing there—may grow into a more important role. Tra-
ditionally, small newspapers with an intellectual image
were the major representatives of this pluralism in the
media landscape. Increasingly, the Internet has taken
over this role. As this study focuses on journalistic mass
media reporting on policy issues, the relevant part of the
Internet are news websites.
In order to allow for a more fine-tuned differentia-
tion, we have divided print media into pro-government,
independent, and opposition. In the case of Kazakhstan,
there also is a critical mass of business newspapers and
journals which—similar to the ‘Financial Times’ and ‘The
Economist’ in Great Britain, for instance—address first of
all a business audience, but offer comprehensive report-
ing about political events.
The data for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, reported in
Tables 2 and 3, clearly support the assessment that TV
reporting is closest to the government and thus the least
pluralistic. The share of quotes from official representa-
tive of the regime is above 50% and the share of formally
non-aligned experts does not exceed 5%. At the same
time, reports with a neutral stance about the policy issue
dominate with about 70%.
The picture for the other media types, though, is
much less clear cut. Azerbaijani print media fit the expec-
tation of more pluralism. Concerning the share of quotes
from representatives of the regime, the difference be-
tween pro-government and oppositional print media is
much less distinct than the difference between print me-
dia in total and TV. News websites in general are simi-
lar to oppositional print media in the share of quotes
fromofficial representatives of the regime. Formally non-
aligned experts, though, are most visible online. At the
same time, the share of neutral reports is highest for
news websites.
In Kazakhstan, however, business-oriented print me-
dia offers the highest degree of pluralism as far as quotes
Table 2. Azerbaijan: Share of different groups in total number of quotes by media type. Source: Authors’ own analysis and
calculation.
TV Print total Print-pro Print-opp Websites
President 23% 12% 16% 15% 10%
Pro-government politicians 15% 17% 16% 19% 15%
State officials 14% 13% 12% 13% 12%
Total official regime 52% 23% 25% 17% 17%
Opposition 11% 14% 13% 12% 11%
Foreign politicians 17% 24% 22% 18% 21%
Business representatives 24% 31% 39% 33% 31%
Experts 15% 18% 12% 20% 30%
N (total no. of quotes) 565 512 248 110 351
Note: As one newspaper has been coded as independent, it counted neither as pro-government nor as opposition. As a result, the sums
of print-pro and print-opp are smaller than the total for print.
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Table 3. Kazakhstan: Share of different groups in total number of quotes by media type. Source: Authors’ own analysis and
calculation.
TV Print total Print-pro Print-opp Print-bus Websites
President 27% 12% 17% 12% 7% 16%
Pro-government politicians 18% 17% 16% 28% 16% 23%
State officials 15% 10% 11% 16% 19% 10%
Total official regime 59% 40% 44% 46% 33% 49%
Opposition 10% 10% 11% 10% 10% 10%
Foreign politicians 19% 18% 20% 17% 20% 14%
Business representatives 19% 26% 27% 22% 24% 29%
Experts 13% 16% 19% 15% 24% 17%
N (total no. of quotes) 124 623 235 65 221 234
Note: The three business print publications included in the analysis are not coded as pro-government or opposition, so there is no over-
lap between the three sub-categories for print publications. As three non-business newspapers have been coded as independent, they
counted neither as pro-government nor as opposition. As a result, the sums of print-pro, print-opp and print-bus are smaller than the
total for print.
are concerned. It has the lowest figure for the share
of quotes from regime representatives and the highest
share of quotes from experts. Kazakhstan’s news web-
sites have an even higher share of quotes from business
people, but the share of experts is lower only in TV re-
porting. At the same time, news websites have the high-
est share of non-neutral assessments, being the only me-
dia type in Kazakhstan where less than half of all assess-
ments are neutral.
5. Conclusions
Our results for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as typical fully
authoritarian regimes illustrate that internal media plu-
ralism is so limited that it is completely toothless in polit-
ical terms. The political opposition is not visible in mass
media reporting at all—outside its own small print out-
let in Azerbaijan. As a result, pluralism is restricted to ex-
perts and foreigners. As the policy option preferred by
the regime is often not clear at the time of reporting,
mostmedia outlets opt for a neutral stance in order to err
on the side of caution. Consequently, even in ‘ordinary’
politics—which pose no threat at all to regime survival—
controversial debates about different policy options do
not take place in the mass media. That is why the sit-
uation in Turkmenistan—at least in relation to internal
media pluralism—seems to differ more in degree than
in kind.
Though there is a difference between types of me-
dia, with the exception of TV it is not clear-cut. In both
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, TV is clearly the least plu-
ralistic medium in terms of quotes and the most neu-
tral in terms of opinion. Between the other media types
the differences are minor when it comes to pluralism
of sources, with the business press in Kazakhstan being
the only outlier offering more pluralism. As far as ex-
pression of opinion is concerned, news websites in Kaza-
khstan offer slightly more non-neutral assessments than
the other media types, while those in Azerbaijan offer
markedly less.
A tentative explanation for these differences might
be that those media outlets which are most clearly asso-
ciated with the opposition, like oppositional newspapers
and also news websites in Azerbaijan, have to be care-
ful not to overdo their criticism as they are under special
surveillance. Media outlets which are considered to be
closer to the regime, like business print media and many
news websites in Kazakhstan, may find it easier to voice
some different opinions as their loyalty to the regime is
less likely to be questioned.
In summary, using the terminology of discourse the-
ory, one can state that fully authoritarian regimes—as
long as they remain stable—enjoy discursive hegemony
in mass media not only in the discourse about regime le-
gitimacy but also in ‘ordinary’ policy discourses.
Thus, if we take TV reporting as a ‘mirror’ of the rul-
ing elites, we obtain some insights into the elite structure
in the countries under study. First, in Turkmenistan, au-
thoritarian rule is clearly more personalised. Even on or-
dinary policy matters, it is first of all the president who
personally speaks for the regime. In Azerbaijan and Kaza-
khstan, however, it is a broad group of political elites and
state officials who represent amore collective leadership
to TV audiences. Business representatives form a distinc-
tive and highly visible group in TV reporting in Azerbai-
jan and Kazakhstan—where they collectively get more
quotes than the respective president. This highlights the
role of business actors (including foreign ones) in patron-
age schemes, or ‘pyramids of power’ (Hale, 2015), in fully
authoritarian regimes. In Turkmenistan, however, busi-
ness as a relevant actor is marginalized. This again points
to more centralised rule in Turkmenistan.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 103–111 108
However, unlike the Chinese leadership, the example
which we quoted in the introduction, the ruling elites
in fully authoritarian regimes of the post-Soviet region
do not seem to use any mass media as a way to ob-
tain a second opinion on policy issues or to manage pub-
lic dissent. This is in contrast to ‘authoritarian upgrad-
ing’, which uses mass media to check public sentiment,
to build pre-emptive consensus and to channel dissent
(cf. e.g., Cavatorta, 2010; Heilmann, 2010; Heydemann,
2007). Nevertheless, all three post-Soviet regimes have
achieved a remarkable degree of stability.
In this context, our results point in two directions
reaching beyond our own research. First, as mass media
do not give a voice to the political opposition in fully au-
thoritarian regimes, a focus on social media is justified.
Although, authoritarian regimes—including in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan—have increasingly used social media to
promote their ownagenda, harass its critics or dissuade In-
ternet users frompolitical activism (Anceschi, 2015; Freed-
man & Shafer, 2014; Lewis, 2016; Pearce, 2014, 2015;
Pearce & Kendzior, 2012), social media are still the only
communication channel through which oppositional ac-
tivists can reach a broader audience. The decline of jour-
nalistic mass media vis-à-vis social media does not neces-
sarily favour the opposition, but it offers a new arena—
one which is also used by journalists who have been os-
tracised by the regime. In this respect, Turkmenistan as a
closed authoritarian regime presents an extreme case be-
cause here not even social media can fulfil that function.
Second, while the difference between fully author-
itarian regimes like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the
one hand, and closed authoritarian regimes like Turk-
menistan on the other, is clearly visible in the degree of
internal pluralism, its impact on domestic politics should
be limited, as opposing voices are not represented in
mass media in either regime type. If there is a distinc-
tion between full and closed authoritarianism, it most
likely lies in the interaction between political elites, not
in mass media communication with the broader pub-
lic. Thus, concerning media pluralism, the distinction be-
tween fully authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes
might be more relevant. Though a systematic compari-
son is still lacking, a cursory look atmedia reporting in hy-
brid regimes demonstrates that the opposition—though
discriminated against—is clearly visible inmassmedia re-
porting, e.g., in the post-Soviet region in the cases of Kyr-
gyzstan, Ukraine, or Russia (especially before 2008).
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